Asymptotic Privacy Loss due to Time Series Matching of Dependent Users by Takbiri, Nazanin et al.
Asymptotic Privacy Loss due to Time Series
Matching of Dependent Users
Nazanin Takbiri*
Electrical and
Computer Engineering
UMass-Amherst
ntakbiri@umass.edu
Minting Chen*
Electrical and
Computer Engineering
UMass-Amherst
mintingchen@umass.edu
Dennis L. Goeckel
Electrical and
Computer Engineering
UMass-Amherst
goeckel@ecs.umass.edu
Amir Houmansadr
Information and
Computer Sciences
UMass-Amherst
amir@cs.umass.edu
Hossein Pishro-Nik
Electrical and
Computer Engineering
UMass-Amherst
pishro@ecs.umass.edu
Abstract—The Internet of Things (IoT) promises to improve
user utility by tuning applications to user behavior, but revealing
the characteristics of a user’s behavior presents a significant
privacy risk. Our previous work has established the challenging
requirements for anonymization to protect users’ privacy in a
Bayesian setting in which we assume a powerful adversary who
has perfect knowledge of the prior distribution for each user’s
behavior. However, even sophisticated adversaries do not often
have such perfect knowledge; hence, in this paper, we turn our
attention to an adversary who must learn user behavior from
past data traces of limited length. We also assume there exists
dependency between data traces of different users, and the data
points of each user are drawn from a normal distribution. Results
on the lengths of training sequences and data sequences that
result in a loss of user privacy are presented.
Index Terms—Anonymization, information theoretic privacy,
inter-user dependency, Internet of Things (IoT), Privacy-
Protection Mechanisms (PPM).
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet of Things (IoT) allows users to share and
access information on a large scale, but the IoT also comes
with a significant threat to users’ privacy: leakage of sensitive
information [1]. There are two main approaches to augment
privacy for IoT users: identity perturbation and data perturba-
tion. Identity perturbation (or anonymization) is the removal
of the identifying information from a set of data to protect
privacy [2], [3], whereas data perturbation (or obfuscation)
is the process of adding noise to the data [4]. A cost for
employing these Privacy-Protection Mechanisms (PPMs) is a
reduction in utility and efficiency of the user data; therefore,
optimizing the level of PPMs is of great interest.
In [5], [6], a comprehensive analysis of the asymptotic
(in the length of the time series) optimal matching of time
series to source distributions is presented in a non-Bayesian
setting, where the number of users is a fixed, finite value.
In contrast, we have adopted a Bayesian setting in [7]–[10],
where a powerful adversary is assumed to have accurate prior
distributions for user behavior through past observations or
other sources. We consider the length of observations available
to the adversary that guarantee privacy, or, conversely, the
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length of observations for which privacy is compromised [7]–
[9], [11]. In [9], our most significant results are converse re-
sults that demonstrate that this powerful adversary can exploit
correlations between the data of different users to compromise
user privacy. Thus, a limitation of the converse results of
[9] is that they are predicated on a very powerful adversary,
which, while desirable for (forward) results that guarantee
privacy, should be relaxed if possible for (converse) results
that demonstrate the loss of privacy. Our main contribution in
this letter is to resolve this limitation by developing converse
results assuming that the adversary does not have perfect
knowledge of the statistics of users’ behavior but rather a set
of data containing past behavior for each user, from which the
adversary can learn user characteristics.
An initial investigation in [12] was restricted to obtaining
the necessary conditions for breaking privacy for a finite
number of users. In contrast, here we turn our attention to
this problem in the most general setting of our prior work
with an asymptotically large number of users [7]–[9], [11].
In particular, contrary to [11], [12], we allow for inter-user
correlation as in [9]. Furthermore, we bring our results closer
to practice by, rather than presuming the user’s data is discrete-
valued [7]–[9], [11], considering a Gaussian model for users’
data, as Gaussian distributed data has been considered in
various domains, e.g., sensor networks [13] and distributed
consensus [14], as a promising substitute to real data. Cullina
et al. have also investigated the related problem of database
alignment in a different framework, in which the conditions for
exact recovery of the correspondence between database entries
have been obtained [15]. The rest of the paper is organized as
follows. In Section II, we present the system model, metrics,
and definitions. Then, we present the construction and analysis
in Section III, and in Section IV, we draw conclusions.
II. FRAMEWORK
Define a system with n users, where each user creates a
series of m data points, and the adversary seeks to identify
users based on this collection of data points. Let Xu(k) be the
data point of user u at time k. The vectors Xu will be termed
the “actual data set”:
Xu = [Xu(1), Xu(2), · · · , Xu(m)]T , u ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n}.
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For every user, there is also a series of l data points represent-
ing the user’s past behavior; we term these vectors Wu the
“Learning Data Set”:
Wu = [Wu(1),Wu(2), · · · ,Wu(l)]T , u ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n}.
For k ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,m} and k ′ ∈ {1, 2, · · · , l}, Xu(k) and Wu(k ′)
are drawn from a user-specific probability distribution. In
particular, we assume that the points in the data sets of a given
user user are drawn from a normal distribution N(µu, σ2),
where µu is the mean of the data of user u and σ2 is its
variance. While the µu’s are unknown to the adversary, each
of them is drawn independently from a continuous density
function fµ(x). We assume the mild technical condition that
there exists δ > 0 such that fµ(x) < δ for all x. Further,
the points in the two data sets Xu(k) and Wu(k ′) are drawn
independently from those in the other set, and, within each
set, independently across index (k or k ′), although there may
be inter-user correlation as described below.
In order to protect the privacy of the users, anonymization
is employed as a PPM that conceals the mapping between the
learning data set and the actual data set by using a random
permutation function (Π). The result of permuting Xu yields
the “observed data set”:
Yu = [Yu(1),Yu(2), · · · ,Yu(m)]T , u ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n},
where each Yu(k) has a normal distribution N(µΠ−1(u), σ2);
µΠ−1(u) is the mean of the trace in the actual data set that
gets mapped to the uth position in the observed data set by
the permutation. Thus, we have Yu = XΠ−1(u) and YΠ(u) = Xu .
Figure 1 shows the relation of the three data sets.
Fig. 1: The goal of the adversary: match each sequence in
the learning data set Wu , u = 1, 2, . . . , n, to a sequence in the
observed data set Yu , u = 1, 2, . . . , n.
Association Graph: The dependencies between users are
modeled by an association graph G(V, E), whereV represents
the nodes and E represents the edges. In this graph, two users
are connected if they are dependent. More specifically, we
assume
• (u, u′) ∈ E if and only if Covuu′ > 0,
• (u, u′) < E if and only if Covuu′ = 0,
where Covuu′ is the covariance of the data of user u and user
u′ at any given time.
Adversary Model: The adversary performs statistical match-
ing between the learning data set
{
Wu, u = 1, 2, · · · , n
}
and
the observed data set
{
Yu, u = 1, 2, · · · , n
}
to match traces
in the former, which contains identifying information, with
Fig. 2: The structure of the association graph (G): Group
g with sg vertices is disjoint from the remainder of the
association graph (G′).
traces in the latter. We assume the adversary knows the
structure of the association graph G(V, E). The adversary also
has knowledge of the anonymization mechanism (i.e. that a
random permutation is employed), but not the realization of
the random permutation.
We define a user having no privacy as [8]:
Definition 1. User u has no privacy at time k if there exists
an algorithm for the adversary to estimate Xu(k) perfectly as
n goes to infinity. In other words, as n→∞,
∀k ∈ N, Pe(u) , P
(
X̂u(k) , Xu(k)
)
→ 0,
where X̂u(k) is the adversary’s estimate of Xu(k).
III. IMPACT OF EMPLOYING TRAINING DATA ON PRIVACY
USING ANONYMIZATION
The proof of our key result incorporating learning data sets
follows the same three steps as that in [9] for the case that the
adversary has perfect knowledge of the statistical behavior of
the users. However, because we need to employ learning data
and the data points are drawn from Gaussian distributions,
there are technical challenges in the second two steps, as
illustrated below.
In the first step, we consider the ability of the adversary to
fully reconstruct the structure of the association graph of the
anonymized version of the data.
Lemma 1. If for any λ > 0, the adversary obtains m =
nλ points in the observation data set, they can reconstruct
G˜ = G˜(V˜, E˜), where V˜ = {Π(u) : u ∈ V} = V, such
that with high probability, for all u, u′ ∈ V; (u, u′) ∈ E iff(
Π(u),Π(u′)) ∈ E˜ . We write this statement as P(E˜ = E) → 1.
Proof. The reconstruction of the association graph does not
require the adversary’s knowledge about user statistics (i.e., the
values of µu’s) [9, Lemma 1]. Thus, according to the result of
[16, Lemma 1], the adversary is able to fully reconstruct the
structure of the association graph of the anonymized version
of the data with arbitrarily small error probability independent
of the length of the learning data set. 
Without loss of generality, assume that User 1 belongs to
Group 1 of size s. In contrast to [9]: (i) the data points are
drawn from a Gaussian distribution; and, more importantly,
(ii) the adversary does not know the statistics of the users in
Group 1, but rather only has the learning data sets for those
users. In the next step, we demonstrate how the adversary can
identify Group 1 among all of the groups given sufficiently
long data traces.
Lemma 2. If for any α, α′ > 0, the adversary obtains learning
data sets containing l = n
2
s +α
′
data points of past behavior for
each user, and observation data sets containing m = n
2
s +α data
points for each user, and knows the structure of the association
graph, they can identify the traces in the observation data set
that correspond to users in Group 1 with arbitrarily small error
probability.
Proof. Note that there are at most ns groups of size s in the
system, which we label 1, 2, · · · , ns . Define the mean vector
for users in Group 1 as:
P(1) =
[
µ1, µ2, · · · , µs
]
,
and the vectors of empirical averages for the two sets of data
which the adversary seeks to match as:
W(1) =
[
W1,W2, · · · ,W s
]
, Y(1) =
[
Y1,Y2, · · · ,Y s
]
,
where Wu = 1l
∑l
i=1Wu(i) and Yu = 1m
∑m
i=1Yu(i). Let Πs
be the set of all permutations on s users; for pis ∈ Πs, pis :
{1, 2, · · · , s} → {1, 2, · · · , s} is a one-to-one mapping. For any
two length-s vectors U and V, we define a difference function
that takes into account any permutation of those vectors:
D (U,V) = min
pis ∈Πs
{| |U − Vpis | |∞} ,
where | |U| |∞ = maxi=1,2,...,k Ui for length-k vector U. It is
straightforward to show that D (U,V) satisfies the triangle
inequality, which we will employ below.
Now, defining P(g),W(g), and Y(g) for groups g = 2, 3, . . . , ns
in an analogous way to the definitions of P(1), W(1), and Y(1),
respectively, we claim for m = n
2
s +α, l = n
2
s +α
′
, and as n →
∞:
1) P
(
D
(
W(1),Y(1)
)
≤ ∆n
)
→ 1,
2) P
(
n
s⋃
g=2
D
(
W(1),Y(g)
)
≤ ∆n
)
→ 0,
where ∆n = n−
1
s − α
′′
4 , and α′′ = min{α, α′}. For each u ∈
{1, 2, · · · , n},
P
( Xu −Wu  ≥ ∆n) = P ( (Xu − µu) − (Wu − µu) ≥ ∆n)
≤ P
( Xu − µu  + Wu − µu  ≥ ∆n)
≤ P
({ Xu − µu  ≥ ∆n2 } ⋃ { Wu − µu  ≥ ∆n2 }
)
≤ P
( Xu − µu  ≥ ∆n2 ) + P ( Wu − µu  ≥ ∆n2 )
≤ e
−m∆2n
8σ2 + e
−l∆2n
8σ2 ≤ 2e− n
α′′
2
8σ2 , (1)
where α′′ = min{α, α′}. The first inequality follows from
the triangle inequality. The union bound yields the third
inequality, and the fourth inequality is based on the error
function inequality erf(x) ≥ 1 − e−x2 . By employing (1) and
applying the union bound for all of the users in a group with
size s, we have for any group g that:
P
(
D
(
W(g),Y(g)
)
≥ ∆n
)
≤
s∑
u=1
P
( Xu −Wu  ≥ ∆n)
= sP
( Xu −Wu  ≥ ∆n)
≤ 2se− n
α′′
2
8σ2 . (2)
Hence, letting g = 1, P
(
D
(
W(1),Y(1)
)
≤ ∆n
)
→ 1, as n →
∞. Next, we want to show that P
(
n
s⋃
g=2
D
(
W(1),Y(g)
)
≤ ∆n
)
→
0, as n→∞. We do this in three steps.
• First, recalling the (mild) technical condition that the prob-
ability density function from which the user means is drawn
is upper bounded by δ and that the user means are drawn
independently, for Group g we obtain:
P
(
| |P(1) − P(g) | |∞ ≤ 4∆n
)
≤ (8∆n)sδ = 8sn−1− sα
′′
4 δ.
Similarly, for all pis ∈ Πs , we have
P
(
| |P(1) − P(g)pis | |∞ ≤ 4∆n
)
≤ 8sn−1− sα
′′
4 δ.
Employing union bounds, since |Πs | = s!, we have
P
©­­«
n
s⋃
g=2
{
D
(
P(g)pis ,P(1)
)
≤ 4∆n
}ª®®¬
= P
©­­«
n
s⋃
g=2

⋃
pis ∈Πs
{
| |P(1) − P(g)pis | |∞ ≤ 4∆n
}
ª®®¬
≤
n
s∑
g=2
∑
pis ∈Πs
P
(
| |P(1) − P(g)pis | |∞ ≤ 4∆n
)
≤ n
s
s!8sn−1−
sα′′
4 δ = (s − 1)!8sn− sα
′′
4 δ→ 0,
as n→∞. Thus, with high probability, the difference between
all P(g), g ≥ 2, and P(1) is bigger than 4∆n.
• Second, for all u ∈ {2, 3, · · · , n}, erf(x) ≥ 1 − e−x2 yields
P
( Wu − µu  ≥ ∆n) ≤ e− l∆2n2σ2 ≤ e− n α′′22σ2 .
Thus, by employing union bounds, we have
P
(
D
(
W(g),P(g)
)
≥ ∆n
)
≤ P
(
‖W(g) − P(g)‖∞ ≥ ∆n
)
≤
∑
u∈Group l
P
( Wu − µu  ≥ ∆n)
= se−
n
α′′
2
2σ2 .
Now, for g = 1, as n→∞, we have
P
(
D
(
W(1),P(1)
)
≥ ∆n
)
≤ se− n
α′′
2
2σ2 → 0.
• Thirdly, since we have shown above that with high prob-
ability, D
(
P(g),P(1)
)
≥ 4∆n and D
(
W(g),P(g)
)
≤ ∆n, for all
l ∈ {2, 3, · · · , ns }, by the triangle inequality we have
P
(
D
(
W(g),W(1)
)
≤ 2∆n
)
≤ P
(
D
(
W(g),P(g)
)
≥ ∆n
)
≤ se− n
α′′
2
2σ2 ,
and by applying a union bound, as n→∞,
P
©­­«
n
s⋃
g=2
{
D
(
W(g),W(1)
)
≤ 2∆n
}ª®®¬
≤
n
s∑
g=2
P
(
D
(
W(g),Y(1)
)
≤ 2∆n
)
=
n
s
se−
n
α′′
2
2σ2 = ne−
n
α′′
2
2σ2 → 0.
• Finally, since we have shown that, with high probability,
D
(
W(g),Y(g)
)
≤ ∆n and D
(
W(g),W(1)
)
≥ 2∆n, for all g ∈
{2, 3, · · · , ns }:
P
(
D
(
W(1),Y(g)
)
≤ ∆n
)
≤ P
(
D
(
Y(g),W(g)
)
≥ ∆n
)
≤ 2se− n
α′′
2
8σ2 → 0, (3)
as n → ∞, where the second inequality follows from (2).
Employing (3) and a union bound, as n→∞ we have
P
©­­«
n
s⋃
g=2
{
D
(
W(1),Y(g)
)
≤ ∆n
}ª®®¬
≤
n
s∑
g=2
P
(
D
(
Y(g),W(g)
)
≥ ∆n
)
≤ n
s
2se−
n
α′′
2
8σ2 = 2ne−
n
α′′
2
8σ2 → 0.
Hence, we can conclude that if m = n
2
s +α, l = n
2
s +α
′
, and
n → ∞, the adversary can identify the data traces in the
observed data set belonging to users in Group 1 with small
error probability. 
Finally, in the following lemma, we show that once the data
traces in the observed data set belonging to users in Group 1
are identified, the adversary can identify the data trace in the
observed data set for each of the members of Group 1 with
arbitrarily small error probability.
Lemma 3. If for any α, α′ > 0, the adversary obtains learning
data sets containing l = n
2
s +α
′
data points of past behavior for
each user, and observation data sets containing m = n
2
s +α data
points for each user, and knows which traces in the observation
data set belong to members of Group 1, the adversary can
identify the trace in the observation set belonging to user 1
with arbitrarily small error probability.
Proof. We claim that, for m = n
2
s +α, l = n
2
s +α
′
, and as n→∞,
1) P
( X1 −W1 ≤ ∆n) → 1,
2) P
(
s⋃
u=2
Xu −W1 ≤ ∆n) → 0,
where ∆n = n−(
1
s +
α′′
4 ), and α′′ = min{α, α′}.
1) The first claim follows from (1) with u = 1 by taking
n→∞.
2) Next we establish the second claim. Recall the (mild)
technical assumption that fµ(x) < δ for some δ. Then, for
all u ∈ {2, 3, · · · , n},
P(|µu − µ1 | ≤ 4∆n) ≤ 8∆nδ.
A union bound yields
P
©­«
s⋃
u=2
{ µu − µ1 ≤ 4∆n}ª®¬ ≤
s∑
u=2
P
( µu − µ1 ≤ 4∆n)
≤ 8s∆nδ = 8sn−1− α
′′
4 δ→ 0,
as n → ∞. This means that, with high probability, all of the
µu for u > 1 fall outside of the range of µ1 ± 4∆n.
Next, for all u ∈ {2, 3, · · · , n}, erf(x) ≥ 1 − e−x2 yields
P
( Wu − µu  ≥ ∆n) ≤ e− l∆2n2σ2 .
Thus, for u = 1, as n→∞, we have
P
( W1 − µ1 ≥ ∆n) ≤ e− n α′′22σ2 → 0,
which means W1 is inside µ1 ± ∆n with high probability.
Thus, we have now shown with high probability that |µu −
µ1 | ≥ 4∆n and |Wu − µu | ≤ ∆n, for all u ∈ {2, 3, · · · , n}; thus,
the triangle inequality yields:
P
( Wu −W1 ≤ 2∆n) ≤ P ( Wu − µu  ≥ ∆n)
≤ e−
l∆2n
2σ2 ≤ e− n
α′′
2
2σ2 .
Applying a union bound, as n→∞, we have
P
©­«
s⋃
u=2
{ Wu −W1 ≤ 2∆n}ª®¬ ≤
s∑
u=2
P
( Wu −W1 ≤ 2∆n)
= se−
n
α′′
2
2σ2 → 0.
Finally, since |Xu −Wu | ≤ ∆n and |Wu −W1 | ≥ 2∆n, for all
u ∈ {2, 3, · · · , s}, with high probability, we can employ (1) to
obtain:
P
( Xu −W1 ≤ ∆n) = P ( Xu −Wu  ≥ ∆n) ≤ 2e− n α′′28σ2 .
As n→∞, a union bound yields:
P
©­«
s⋃
u=2
{ Xu −W1 ≤ ∆n}ª®¬ ≤
s∑
u=2
P
( Xu −Wu  ≥ ∆n)
≤ 2se− n
α′′
2
8σ2 → 0.

From Lemmas 1, 2, and 3, we can conclude that a user will
have no privacy if the number of data points (m) per user in
the observation data set and the number of data points (l) per
user in the the learning data set are both significantly larger
than n
2
s as the number of users in the network (n) goes to
infinity, and the size of the group to which the user of interest
belongs is equal to s.
Theorem 1. For the system model with Gaussian data points
of Section II, where Y is the anonymized version of X, and
W is the behavioral history of users, user 1 has no privacy at
time k if:
• The adversary knows the structure of the association
graph;
• The adversary has access to a l−length behavioral history
for each of the users, where l = Ω
(
cn
2
s +α
′)
for any α >
0;
• The adversary has access to a m−length observation for
each of the users, where m = Ω
(
cn
2
s +α
)
for any α > 0;
The argument for the case where the adversary has perfect
prior knowledge about users’ past behavior in the Gaussian
case, which is not covered by our prior work, follows from
arguments similar to those leading to Theorem 1 and [16,
Theorem 1].
Theorem 2. For the system model with Gaussian data points
of Section II where Y is the anonymized version of X, user 1
has no privacy at time k if:
• The adversary knows the structure of the association
graph;
• The adversary has access to perfect prior knowledge
about users’ behavior;
• The adversary has access to a m−length observations for
each of the users, where m = Ω
(
cn
2
s +α
′)
for any α′ > 0;
IV. CONCLUSION
IoT devices provide significant convenience for users, but
they can allow an adversary to obtain a user’s sensitive infor-
mation. In this paper, given that anonymization is employed
to ensure users’ privacy, we consider the broadest set of
assumptions compared to previous work: (i) we assume the
adversary only has access to limited data sets for users’ past
behavior rather than perfect knowledge of the statistics of
users’ behavior; (ii) we assume the data traces of different
users are dependent; (iii) we assume that users’ data sequences
are governed by an i.i.d. Gaussian model. We established suffi-
cient conditions for an adversary to reconstruct the association
graph that represents the dependency between users, identify
a specific group of dependent users, and determine all of the
members of the identified group, hence breaking the privacy of
individual users. In particular, if the length (l) of the learning
data set and the length (m) of the observed data set are each
significantly larger than n
2
s , users have no privacy.
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